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BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON INDONESIA, THE INVASION OF EAST TIMOR AND U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

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INTRODUCTION

Since 1965 Indonesia has been considered a valuable friend of the United States--too valuable, in fact, to risk offending over repeated human rights violations committed by the military regime against its own people, and continuing allegations of genocide in East Timor, a former Portuguese colony invaded by Indonesia in 1975. With 147 million inhabitants, Indonesia is the largest member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the fifth most populous country in the world. It is one of the least developed nations in Southeast Asia: per capita income is only $385 per year; infant mortality rates are inordinately high; there are chronic food shortages; and nearly one half of the population lives substantially below the poverty line. However, Indonesia is very rich in high quality petroleum products, and provides 6% of U.S. oil imports. It is also a major supplier of tin, rubber, copper and wood, and an important market for U.S. goods and services. And since 1965, Indonesia has become a "paradise" for multinational corporations.

Like the military dictatorships in Latin America's southern cone, the Indonesian generals have allied themselves with powerful foreign interests for the joint exploitation of domestic markets, resources and labor. The passage of a lax Foreign Investment Law in 1967 led to a major influx of foreign capital, with U.S. corporations leading the way. By 1973, foreign interests reportedly controlled 59% of capital invested in forestry, 96% of mining, 35% in industry, 47% in hotels and tourism, and 33% in agriculture and fisheries.[1] By 1981, U.S. exports to Indonesia stood at $1 billion per year, investments outside the petroleum sector were 600 million, and $1.5 billion per year was being expended by U.S. oil companies in the country.[2]

U.S. trade and investment interests, coupled with the strongly anti-communist stance of the country's military government, have added to the argument that Indonesia is strategically important to the United States. However, many defense experts like Retired Admiral Gene R. LaRocque, Director of the Center for Defense Information, believe that the United States "does not have military or security interests of overriding importance in Indonesia." Nonetheless, all recent U.S. administrations have viewed a strong relationship with Indonesia as necessary for preserving the balance of power in Southeast Asia.[3] Located astride the sea lanes connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, through which regularly pass U.S. and Soviet naval forces and most of the petroleum for Japan and other Asian allies, U.S. policy-makers have seen Indonesia as key to the region's stability, and its military as a surrogate police force protecting U.S. interests.

The United States relationship with the Indonesian military dates back to 1958, the year of an abortive CIA effort to overthrow the government of nationalist leader Sukarno. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Paul Warnke, has stated, in congressional testimony, that U.S. military aid was then provided "not to support an existing regime," but "to preserve a liaison of sorts with the military of the country which in effect turned out to be one of the conclusive elements in the overthrow of that [the Sukarno] regime."[4]

Following the 1965 coup that brought General Suharto to power, the United States became the primary supplier of weapons to Indonesia's armed forces. Prior to the coup, the Soviet Union had been a major supplier of heavy equipment to the Indonesian Navy and Air Force. In line with the emphasis on the doctrine and practice of counterinsurgency during the 1960s, U.S. military assistance became increasingly oriented towards the development of an effective internal security force in Indonesia. The implications of this type of support are particularly important in light of the events that followed the 1965 military coup as well as Indonesia's 1975 invasion of East Timor.

U.S. BACKING AND THE 1965 MILITARY COUP

In October 1965, an apparent left-wing coup attempt led to a counter-coup by Indonesia's present military rulers. Under the leadership of now President Suharto, the new rulers embarked on a "cleaning out" operation of their only serious institutional rival: the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), then the largest Communist Party in the non-communist world. The reign of terror which followed--described as "one of the most extensive and brutal slaughters in human history"--resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of men, women and children, alleged to be communists or communist sympathizers.[5]

In 1968 there was a renewal of mass executions by the military. According to eyewitness acounts, in one instance alone, army and local civil guards in Central Java "killed some 3,500 alleged followers of the PKI by means of blows of iron staves in the neck." An anti-communist expert, Justus M. van der Koef, described this period as one of "endless and often arbitrary arrests, brutalization of prisoners, and an atmosphere of distrust in which exhibitions of violent anti-communism are believed to be the best way to convince suspicious local military of one's bona fides."[6]

Estimates of the number of people massacred during the 1965-1969 period are disputed. The official figure of 500,000, provided by the head of the Indonesian state security system, is generally considered the minimum. Other estimates range from 700,000 to more than 1 million. Additionally, according to Amnesty International, 750,000 people were arrested and imprisoned without charges. Hundreds of these were tried by military courts and sentenced to death, while uncounted thousands died in prison due to malnutrition and untreated illness.[7]

A worldwide campaign by Amnesty International aided in the release between 1977 and 1979 of 30,000 of these political prisoners, most of whom had been held for over 12 years without charges or trial. Today, the released prisoners continue to face tough government restrictions and other forms of government persecution, including the threat of re-arrest. At least several hundred other "1965" prisoners remain in detention.

The Indonesian coup of 1965, like the military coup in Brazil the year before, was welcomed by the United States government on the grounds that it was needed to stave off a communist takeover. This interpretation was generally accepted by the news media, and the resulting massacre of hundreds of thousands of alleged communists and communist sympathizers was dismissed as "an unfortunate reaction to Communist plotting."[8] Many experts believe, however,

that the United States was directly involved in the 1965 coup. The CIA had been involved in Indonesian affairs long before the coup: it had participated in an unsuccessful rebellion in 1958 and had provided funds and intelligence support to the Indonesian military. By the time of the coup, there was an extensive network of links between Indonesian military and U.S. intelligence and military officers. Almost one half of Indonesia's officer corps and one-third of the general staff had reportedly received some sort of training from the U.S., and a substantial portion of Indonesian weapons were made in the United States.[9]

In 1966, with President Suharto firmly in power, the United States began to provide significant amounts of military infrastructure and communications support, and in 1970 added combat equipment, with the objective of helping Indonesia build an effective counterinsurgency force. Between fiscal years 1966 and 1970, U.S. military aid increased fivefold, from $1.1 million to $5.6 million.[10] By 1975, the United States was providing $66.9 million in military assistance to Indonesia, almost twelve times the 1970 level.

U.S. ARMS AND THE INDONESIAN INVASION OF EAST TIMOR

After 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule, East Timor achieved de facto autonomy in the wake of Portugal's 1974 revolution. Following a brief but bloody civil war, the nationalist Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN) defeated its pro-Portuguese rivals by September 1975, and began instituting wide ranging social and economic reforms. On November 28, 1975, FRETILIN, claiming the support of the majority of the East Timorese people, issued a unilateral declaration of independence.[11]

The existence of an independent nation with left-wing policies in the periphery of the archipelago, apparently worried the Indonesian generals, who feared dissident movements in the different parts of the multi-island state. On December 7, 1975, Indonesian military forces invaded the new nation, claiming that an independent East Timor constituted a threat to Indonesia's security by providing an opening for communist influence and subversion.[12] The invading forces encountered stiff resistance, as FRETILIN and its supporters withdrew into the interior highlands from which they have continued to challenge Indonesian control.

Although Indonesia has effectively sealed off East Timor from the outside world, even refusing until 1979 the entry of the International Red Cross, reports of massive atrocities by Indonesian military forces against the East Timorese have filtered through.

In 1980, a representative of the International League for Human Rights declared in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, that "at least 100,000" of a total 1975 population of 650,000 had been killed since the Indonesian invasion. The League also informed the Subcommittee that it had received reports from refugees in Lisbon that East Timorese "were systematically subjected to torture, rape and execution by the Indonesian soldiers."[13] Moreover, since the invasion, another 200,000 East Timorese are reported to have died as a result of starvation and disease.[14]

The U.S. government has certainly not been unaware of the numerous reports of human rights violations in East Timor, yet it has continuously proposed and appropriated increased military assistance to Indonesia since the 1975 invasion. This assistance has flowed through several channels: (1) the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which provides grants of arms, ammunition, training and technical support; (2) the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, which provides similar materiel paid for with cash or credit through the FMS Financing Program; and (3) the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, which provides training to military and paramilitary personnel. In addition, large amounts of arms have been sold to Indonesia by U.S. arms producers through regular commercial channels. (See Table 1.) Specific equipment provided under these programs is listed in Tables 2 and 3, while Table 4 provides a list of weapons sold by U.S. firms to Indonesian police forces.

The role of the United States, particularly U.S. military equipment, in the plight of East Timor deserves close examination. According to Retired Admiral La Rocque, "American military assistance and diplomatic support have been essential to Indonesia's war effort in East Timor." At the time of the 1975 invasion, "roughly 90%" of the arms available to the Indonesian generals were U.S.-supplied.[15] U.S. weapons shipments have since increased. Between fiscal years 1976 and 1982, the U.S. has furnished over $377 million in total military assistance to the Indonesian government. An additional $43 million is planned for fiscal year 1983. (See Table 1.)

At the United Nations, the U.S. government has consistently supported Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over East Timor, despite the U.N.'s repeated rejection of Indonesia's position. U.S. officials have also gone to great lengths to conceal the atrocities committed by their Indonesian allies from both Congress and the press.[16] In its annual human rights reports, for example, the State Department has consistently down-played charges of human rights violations in East Timor, by claiming that "allegations" are difficult to ascertain because of the limited access granted to outside observers wishing to enter East Timor.[17] Yet, while

the State Department has intensively interviewed Cambodian refugees to find out about human rights violations in Cambodia, it has made little or no attempt to seek out any of the more than 2,000 East Timorese refugees in Portugal, even though in 1979 international relief organizations described conditions in East Timor as "worse than Biafra and potentially as serious as Cambodia."[18] Moreover, refugees who have gone to the State Department with their stories claim that most officials give Indonesia the benefit of the doubt. One refugee complained that a State Department official "acted like a lawyer for the Indonesians."[19]

The nature of U.S. arms shipments to Indonesia has been crucial to the occupation of East Timor. While successive U.S. administrations have presented these shipments as essential for Indonesia's defense needs, Professor Benedict Anderson, a Cornell University expert on Indonesia, provided a very different perspective in his 1978 testimony before Congress:

> The point needs to be stressed that weapons deliveries to Indonesia over the past two years have been of a type useful for domestic repression or aggression against its immediate neighbours, not for external defence. In fact, no remotely plausible case can be made that Indonesia faces any serious external threat. No one imagines that the Chinese or Vietnamese have either the means or the interest to send an invading armada across the South China Sea. And in any case, Indonesia's maritime frontiers are fully protected by the immense power of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.[20]

In 1977, hearings before the House International Relations Committee brought out that the following equipment, supplied by the United States, was used by Indonesia in East Timor: OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency aircraft, Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft, Bell UH-1 and S-61 helicopters, Cadillac-Gage V-150 Commando armored cars, patrol craft, M-16 rifles, pistols, mortars, machine guns, recoiless rifles, ammunition, and extensive communications equipment. (See Tables 2 and 3.) Other U.S. equipment--A-4M Skyhawk attack aircraft, Beech Musketeer light trainer aircraft, and ex-U.S. Navy destroyer escorts--may also have been used in East Timor.[21]

The counterinsurgency equipment supplied by the United States has been essential to the success of Indonesia's search and destroy missions, which by most accounts have caused the great majority of deaths in East Timor. U.S.-supplied Rockwell OV-10 Bronco aircraft, in particular, have been critical to Indonesia's operations in the island. Described as "one of the most deadly and most versatile light strike and counterinsurgency aircraft in the world," the OV-10 was used extensively by U.S. forces in Vietnam. The airplane is designed for close-combat

support of counterinsurgency missions, is equipped with infrared detectors, and can carry up to 3600 pounds of ordnance, grenade launchers, rockets, napalm and machine guns.[22]

The timing of U.S. military assistance to Indonesia has been critical. Less than 24 hours before Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, President Gerald Ford--on a visit to Jakarta with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger--pledged a 450% increase in military aid for fiscal year 1976. The largest items in the package of Foreign Military Sales Agreements were 16 OV-10 Bronco aircraft for $18.5 million, 3 Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft for $7.7 million, and 45 Cadillac-Gage V-150 Commando armored cars for $6.3 million (only 36 of which were actually delivered). The V-150 armored cars, which hold a crew of up to 12 combat troops, can be equipped with machine guns, an 81 mm mortar, a 20 mm cannon, and smoke and tear gas launchers, are considered to be very effective in counterinsurgency missions where the enemy has only small arms. In 1975, the United States had also provided Indonesia with some other important weapons, nearly all of which are believed to have been used in East Timor: $92,000 worth of rifles, $104,000 worth of small arms spare parts, and some communications spare parts.[23]

U.S. weapons enabled Indonesia to carry out its two major offensives against the continuing FRETILIN resistance in 1977 and 1978. According to Retired Admiral La Rocque, the delivery of OV-10 Bronco aircraft between 1976 and 1977 "changed the entire nature of the war." With this equipment, Indonesian forces were able to drive deep into the FRETILIN-controlled highlands in the interior, and force the population into the valley areas and so-called "resettlement centers".[24]

In 1978, with its military inventory depleted by the continuing war in East Timor, the Suharto government launched an extensive rearmament program. The Carter Administration responded to Indonesia's request by increasing the State Department's original request for $25 million in FMS sales to almost $110 million. In May 1978, during a visit to Jakarta, Vice-President Walter Mondale offered to sell Indonesia 16 A-4 Skyhawk II jet attack planes. The A-4 Skyhawk, a mainstay of the U.S. arsenal during the Vietnam war, is capable of spraying wide areas with weapons-fire and high explosives, causing heavy civilian casualties. Also included in the Carter Administration's FMS package were 16 Bell UH-1H Huey helicopters, a type which also saw heavy action in Vietnam.[25] By fiscal year 1978, total U.S. military assistance to Indonesia reached almost $130 million, four times the fiscal year 1977 level.

With renewed military strength, the Indonesian military continued to expand its search and destroy missions in the interior highlands. By the end of 1978, the constant aerial

bombings and the consequent destruction of crops had forced an estimated 300,000 East Timorese to return to the Indonesian-controlled lowlands in search of food and shelter. There they were gathered into the camps where many thousands died of starvation and sickness.[26]

CONCLUSION

As columnist Jack Anderson noted recently in The Washington Post, "the United States played a shameful role in the agony of East Timor."[27] But while successive U.S. administrations have condoned Indonesia's rape of East Timor, U.S.-supplied weapons made possible the initial invasion of the island, and their uninterrupted--and increased--flow has been crucial to Indonesia's 7-year "pacification" campaign.

When President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger gave their tacit approval to the invasion of East Timor, it was hoped by U.S. officials that Indonesia would intervene "effectively, quickly, and not use our equipment."[28] Yet, as is now well known, the Indonesians did use American equipment--an apparent violation of the 1958 U.S.-Indonesian Mutual Defense Agreement*--and U.S. officials could not have believed otherwise. As a high-ranking Indonesian general pointed out, "Of course there were U.S. weapons used [during the attack on East Timor]. These are the only weapons that we have."[29] Moreover, because of the heavy resistance from FRETILIN forces, Indonesia's invasion was neither "quick" nor "effective".

State Department officials have claimed that military aid to Indonesia was suspended from December 1975 to June 1976 to determine whether Indonesia's use of U.S. weapons in East Timor violated the 1958 agreement. However, neither Congress nor the Indonesian government was reportedly informed of the "suspension"

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* This agreement states that: "Any weapon or other military equipment or services purchased by the Government of Indonesia from the Government of the United States shall be used by the Government of Indonesia solely for legitimate national self-defense, and it is self-evident that the Government of Indonesia, as a member of the United Nations Organization, interprets the term "legitimate national self-defense" within the scope of the United Nations Charter, as excluding an act of aggression against any other state."[30]

while it was in effect.* In July 1976, the annexation of East Timor "legitimized" U.S. arms sales since, technically, they would no longer be used outside Indonesian territory.

The Carter Administration, despite its pious talks about human rights, chose to continue Ford's policy of collaboration with one of the world's worst human rights violators. Placing Indonesia in a "not-to-be-criticized" position, the Carter Administration resumed--and vastly extended--military aid, allowing Indonesia to undertake the 1977-78 offensives that brought a Cambodia-like famine to East Timor.

Thus far, the Reagan Administration, too, has chosen to look the other way rather than risk offending its Indonesian ally. Arguing that the United States needs to help Indonesia "counter the growing Soviet and Vietnamese naval presence in Southeast Asia," the State Department has proposed large increases in FMS credits for fiscal years 1982 and 1983.[32] (See Table 1.)

The United States might have been able to prevent the invasion of East Timor simply by withdrawing its implicit approval of Indonesia's plans. As a former CIA official recently noted, "We had lots of time to move the Indonesians in a different direction. Instead, we got right on the Indonesian bandwagon."[33] Today, amidst reports of continuing horrors, the U.S. government is still riding the "bandwagon".

Even though the State Department has sought to reassure concerned members of Congress since 1977 that warfare between Indonesian troops and the East Timorese has ended, and that East Timor's "incorporation" is complete, recent reports from the island atest to the contrary. One of the most recent reports, introduced into the Congressional Record by Senator Paul E. Tsongas (D-Massachusetts), tells of a new "pacification" campaign last summer in which 500 East Timorese, including children and pregnant women, were reported to have been butchered by the Indonesian military. Church sources fear that this latest offensive could lead to a renewal of food shortages, at a time when Indonesia has barred further international food aid for East Timor.[34]

In order to end its complicity in the agony of East Timor,

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* Hearings before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations in 1978 revealed that at least four separate offers and deliveries of military equipment were made to Indonesia's government during the 6-month period of proclaimed "suspension" in 1976 and 1977. These included mainly spare parts and maintenance equipment for Rockwell OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency planes.[31]

the United States government should take the following steps.

(1) It should suspend all non-humanitarian assistance and commercial arms sales to Indonesia.

(2) It should use diplomatic and economic pressures to encourage the government of Indonesia to:

(a) withdraw its troops from East Timor and allow the United Nations to administer the territory until such time as the East Timorese can hold elections or otherwise exercise their right of self-determination;

(b) give journalists, human rights organizations, and relief groups free access to East Timor, so that the situation can be fully and openly assessed, and so that needed food and medical supplies can be provided;

(c) allow East Timorese to freely emigrate.

(3) The U.S. Congress should critically evaluate the history of U.S. involvement in Indonesia, in the hope that the United States can avoid the double standard of supporting future "East Timors," while condemning Soviet actions in Poland and Afghanistan.

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* Special thanks to Arnold Kohen for his assistance in the preparation of this document.

APPENDIX

Table 1

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

1974-1983

(Dollars in Thousands)

FISCAL YEAR	FMS FINANCING PROGRAM	FMS AGREEMENTS	MAP	COMMERCIAL SALES	IMET	TOTAL
1974	(3,500)	148	12,270	859	1,698	14,975
1975	(5,000)	51,609	12,585	304	2,401	66,899
1976	(23,100)	3,715	20,707	6,707	2,359	33,488
1977	(40,000)	7,592	14,121	5,295	2,427	29,435
1978	(32,000)	109,630	14,128	3,011	2,649	129,418
1979	(30,000)	37,855	1,997	17,011	1,960	58,823
1980	(30,000)	14,614	1,840	6,221	1,636	24,311
1981	(30,000)	45,116	417	6,673+	1,823	54,029
1982	(40,000)*	40,000*	123*	10,000*	2,200*	52,323
1983	(50,000)**	30,000*	100**	10,000*	2,625**	42,725
Total 74-83	(283,600)	340,279	78,288	66,081	21,778	506,426

Notes:

* denotes that figures are estimates
** denotes that figures are proposed
+ denotes that figures are preliminary
FMS Agreements = Foreign Military Sales Agreements (includes cash and credit sales of U.S. military equipment)
FMS Financing Program = Foreign Military Sales Financing Program (indicates amount of U.S. credits extended for military purchases)
IMET = International Military Education and Training
Total = includes FMS Agreements, MAP, Commercial Sales, and IMET

Sources:

1974-1981 data: U.S. Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts (as of September 1981), Washington, D.C.
1982-1983 data: U.S. Department of Defense, Congressional Presentation: Security Assistance Programs Fiscal Year 1983, Washington, D.C.

Table 2

U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS TO INDONESIA

1974-1981

No.	WEAPON	DELIVERY DATE	SOURCE
16	LTV A-7 Corsair strike aircraft	1974	SIP 75
3	ex-U.S. Navy destroyers	1974-75	SIP 76
3	Lockheed C-130B transport aircraft	1975	SIP 76
36	Cadillac-Gage V-150 Commando armored cars	1975	OMC
3	patrol boats	1976	CPD 78
3	Bell 47G helicopters	(1976)	SIP 76/77, MB 76-77
2	Bell 206B helicopters	(1976)	SIP 76/77, MB 76-77
16	Rockwell OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency aircraft	1976-77	SIP 78
21	Beech Musketeer light trainer aircraft	(1976-77)	SIP 76/77, MB 76-77
2	Beech King Air 100 transport aircraft	(1976-77)	SIP 76/77, MB 76-77
16	Bell 205 UH-1H helicopters	1978	SIP 79
16	Beech T-34C-1 trainer aircraft	1978	SIP 79
16	General Dynamics RIM-66A/SM-1 naval surface to air missile/ship to ship missile	1979	SIP 79
16	MCDonnell Douglas A-4M Skyhawk II attack aircraft	1978	SIP 79
12	Northrop F-5E Tiger II fighter aircraft	delivered	AOD 81, SIP 80
4	Northrop F-5F fighter aircraft	delivered	AOD 81, SIP 80
2	TA-4H Skyhawk armed trainer aircraft	on order	AOD 81, SIP 80
16	A-4E Skyhawk attack aircraft	1981	AOD 81, MB 81-82
5	Lockheed C-130H-30 stretched transport aircraft	1981	MB 81-82
3	Boeing 737 maritime reconnaissance aircraft	5/82-9/83	MB 81-82
2	Beech King Air C-90 trainer aircraft	on order	SIP 80, SIP 81
3	Lockheed L-100-30 Super Hercules transport	2-on order 1-delivered	SIP 80, AOD 81, SIP 81
21	Beech Musketeer Sport Lightplane	on order	SIP 80, SIP 81

Note: Dates in parentheses are approximations.

Sources:

CPD = Congressional Presentation Document: Security Assistance Programs Fiscal Year 1978, published by the Department of Defense.

OMC = Office of Munitions Control export licenses for commercially sold defense equipment.

SIP = SIPRI Yearbook, published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

MB = Military Balance, published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

AOD = Arsenal of Democracy II, by Tom Gervasi (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1981)

Table 3

VALUE OF SELECTED U.S. POLICE AND PARAMILITARY GEAR EXPORTED UNDER LICENSE TO INDONESIA, FISCAL YEARS 1975-1980

(In Thousands of Dollars)

WEAPON	COMMERCIAL SALE	FMS SALE*	MAP SALE**	TOTAL
Ammunition Raw Materials				
1975	4,575	--	231	4,806
1976	--	--	2579	2,579
1977	3,165	--	701	3,866
1978	20,375	--	933	21,308
1979	44,563	--	578	45,141
1980	--	--	1163	1,163
Total 1975-80	72,678	--	6185	78,863
Armored Cars				
1975	--	--	--	--
1976	--	--	7	7
1977	--	6,344	491	6,835
1978	--	147	--	147
1979	--	--	--	--
1980	--	1,070	490	1,560
Total 1975-80	--	7,561	988	8,549
Carbines				
1975	--	--	--	--
1976	--	--	--	--
1977	500	--	--	500
1978	--	--	--	--
1979	--	--	--	--
1980	--	--	--	--
Total 1975-1980	500	--	--	500
Chemical Agent Equipment				
1975	5,177	--	--	5,177
1976	6,312	--	--	6,312
1977	26,448	--	--	26,448
1978	--	--	--	--
1979	--	--	--	--
1980	455,446	--	--	455,446
Total 1975-80	493,383	--	--	493,383

Table 3 (continued)

WEAPON	COMMERCIAL SALE	FMS SALE*	MAP SALE**	TOTAL
Helmets				
1975	--	--	--	--
1976	--	--	--	--
1977	4,200	--	--	4,200
1978	--	--	--	--
1979	--	--	--	--
1980	180	--	--	180
Total 1975-80	4,380	--	--	4,380
Machine Guns				
1975	--	--	--	--
1976	--	--	--	--
1977	--	--	--	--
1978	--	--	32	32
1979	--	--	56	56
1980	716,480	--	--	716,480
Total 1975-80	716,480	--	88	716,568
Pistols and Revolvers				
1975	--	--	--	--
1976	814	--	--	814
1977	199	--	--	199
1978	--	--	--	--
1979	163	--	--	163
1980	183,968	--	--	183,968
Total 1975-80	185,144	--	--	185,144
Protective Personnel Equipment				
1975	--	--	--	--
1976	--	97,483	--	97,483
1977	--	--	--	--
1978	108,730	336,653	--	445,383
1979	82,137	2,890	--	85,027
1980	830,082	2,272	--	832,354
Total 1975-80	1,020,949	4,392,298	--	1,460,247
Rifles				
1975	92,287	--	230	92,517
1976	1,038	--	--	1,038
1977	16,220	--	--	16,220
1978	19,015	--	1,211	20,226
1979	5,880	--	182	6,062
1980	21,360	--	1,727	23,087
Total 1975-80	155,800	--	3,350	159,150

Table 3 (continued)

WEAPON	COMMERCIAL SALE	FMS SALE*	MAP SALE**	TOTAL
Rifles (Recoiless)				
1975	--	--	--	--
1976	--	--	--	--
1977	--	--	--	--
1978	--	--	130	130
1979	--	--	182	182
1980	--	--	--	--
Total 1975-80	--	--	312	312
Rifles (5.56 MM M16)				
1975	--	--	--	--
1976	--	--	--	--
1977	--	--	--	--
1978	--	--	--	--
1979	3,175,200	--	--	3,175,200
1980	--	--	--	--
Total 1975-80	3,175,200	--	--	3,175,200
Rifles (5.56 MM M16 A1)				
1975	--	--	--	--
1976	--	--	--	--
1977	--	--	--	--
1978	--	--	--	--
1979	4,747,525	--	--	4,747,525
1980	--	--	--	--
Total 1975-80	4,747,525	--	--	4,747,525
Riot Control Agents				
1975	30	--	--	30
1976	--	--	--	--
1977	33,259	--	--	33,259
1978	--	--	--	--
1979	716	--	--	716
1980	19,859	--	--	19,859
Total 1975-80	53,864	--	--	53,864
Submachine Guns				
1975	--	--	--	--
1976	--	--	--	--
1977	--	--	--	--
1978	--	--	--	--
1979	3,780	--	--	3,780
1980	1,236	--	--	1,236
Total 1975-80	5,016	--	--	5,016

Notes:
1) *FMS SALE = Exported under the Foreign Military Sales Program
2) **MAP SALE = Exported under the Military Assistance Program

Source: U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on Military Assistance and Exports as Required by Section 657, Foreign Assistance Act, Fiscal Years 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 (Washington, D.C.).

Table 4

DOCUMENTED U.S. ARMS SALES TO INDONESIAN POLICE FORCES

September 1976 - May 1979

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER/PRODUCT	EXPORTER	LICENSE DATE	RECIPIENT
463	SW crowd control items	SW	8/76	Indonesian Police
100	GO Mk-VII chemical batons	SW	8/76	Indonesian Police
1,366,777 rds.	WI centerfire ammo.	WI	6/77	National Police
250,000	* 8-rd. clips for M-1 rifles	IA	9/78	Dept. of Defense & Security
5	GO Star-tron MK-303A n.v.s.	SW	12/78	Indonesian Police
435	SW gas masks	SW	1/79	Dept. of Police
15,000	CI M-16 rifles	CI	2/79	Dept. of Defense & Security
60,000	CI 30-rd. magazines	CI	2/79	Dept. of Defense & Security
15,000	CI M-7 bayonets w/scabbards	CI	2/79	Dept. of Defense & Security
1,326	CI .38 cal. revolvers	CI	6/79	Dept. of Defense & Security
64	SW #210 gas guns	SW	7/79	Dept. of Police
500	SW 12-ga. launching cart.	SW	7/79	Dept. of Police
300	SW #98 CS riot agent	SW	7/79	Dept. of Police
500	SW .38 cal. launching cart.	SW	7/79	Dept. of Police

Abbreviations: ammo. = ammunition; cal. = caliber; cart. = cartridges; ga. = gauge; n.v.s. = night vision scope; rds. = rounds; * = information unobtainable

Abbreviations of U.S. firms:
CI: Colt Industries, New York, NY
GO: General Ordnance Equipment Corp., Pittsburgh, PA
IA: International Armament Corp., Alexandria, VA
SW: Smith and Wesson, Springfield, MA
WI: Winchester International, New Haven, CT

Source: Reproduced from: Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arnson, Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., 1981, p. 154.

FOOTNOTES

1 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism: The Political Economy of Human Rights Vol. 1 (Boston: South End Press, 1979), pp. 209-210.

2 Prepared Statement of Frederick W. Schiek, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia, AID, in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Economic and Security Assistance in Asia and the Pacific, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982 (Part 5), Hearings and Mark-up before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. 9th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, pp. 466-467.

3 Quoted in Scott Sidell, "The United States and Genocide in East Timor," Journal of Contemporary Asia Vol. 11, No. 1 (1981), pp. 34.

4 Quoted in Chomsky and Herman, Washington Connection, p. 154. For more information on U.S. involvement in the 1958 attempted coup, see also Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 236-237, and Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 100-104.

5 Chomsky and Herman, Washington Connection, pp. 205-209.

6 Quotes from Ibid., p. 208.

7 Ibid., pp. 208-209.

8 Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), pp. 205-206.

9 Chomsky and Herman, Washington Connection, pp. 207-403.

10 Estimated from U.S. Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, FY 1975 and 1976 (Washington, D.C.).

11 Sidell, "The U.S. and Genocide in East Timor," pp. 44-47.

12 Ibid., p. 53. For further discussion of the events preceding and following the invasion of East Timor, see Arnold Kohen and John Taylor, An Act of Genocide: Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor (London: TAPOL, 1979).

13 Prepared Statement of Harris L. Wofford and Maureen Berman, International League for Human Rights, in U.S., Congress, House, Human Rights in Asia: Non-communist Countries, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Organizations. 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, p. 25. (Hereafter cited as Hearings, Human Rights in Asia.)

14 Henry Kamm, "The Silent Suffering of East Timor," New York Times Magazine, 15 February 1981.

15 Testimony of Retired Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, in U.S., Congress, House, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1981 (Part 6), Hearings before the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies. 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, p. 54. (Hereafter cited as Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs.) See also Arnold S. Kohen, "The Shattered World of East Timor," Los Angeles Times, 7 January 1982.

16 Kohen, "Shattered World of East Timor."

17 See testimony of Pat Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in Hearings, Human Rights in Asia, pp. 251-252. See also the Department of State's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

18 Kohen, "Shattered World of East Timor."

19 Christian Science Monitor, 6 March 1980. Refugee accounts continue to reach the outside world, as indicated in a January 13, 1982 article in the London Manchester Guardian, entitled "East Timorese Refugees Tell of Mass Executions."

20 Quoted in Kohen and Taylor, An Act of Genocide, p. 100.

21 Sidell, "The U.S. and Genocide in East Timor," p. 47.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid, p. 48.

24 Ibid., and La Rocque testimony in Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs, p. 47.

25 Sidell, "The U.S. and Genocide in East Timor, " p. 48. The Carter Administration cited the release of political prisoners in 1977-79, as justification for stepped-up arms transfers to Indonesia at a critical phase of the Indonesian military campaign against East Timor.

26 Tom Harkin, "Our Proxy War in East Timor," The Progressive, December 1980, p. 47.

27 Washington Post, 10 April 1982.

28 Quoted in Christian Science Monitor, 17 December 1980.

29 Sidell, "The U.S. and Genocide in East Timor," p. 57.

30 Ibid., p. 57.

31 Harkin, "Our Proxy War," p. 45. See also Noam Chomsky, Radical Priorities (Montreal: Black Rose Books Ltd., 1981), p. 89.

32 U.S. Department of State Bulletin, May 1981, p. 28.

33 Quoted in Christian Science Monitor, 17 December 1980.

34 See Kohen, "Shattered World of East Timor," and Washington Post, 10 April 1982. See also Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debate of the 9th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 128, No. 9 (February 8, 1982).

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